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OPINIONS OF THE COURT
State v, Tolman, Harman, Case No. 870407-CA, was filed
April 27, 1989, and later published at 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 61;
P.2d

(Utah 1989).
The companion case, State v. Harman, Tolman, Case No.

870290-CA, decided January 10, 1989; 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 61;
P.2d

(Utah 1989), preceded it.
JURISDICTION
Petitioner seeks certiorari pursuant to Rules 42 and

43(a)(b)(c) and (d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, for review
of the decision of the Court of Appeals entered April 27, 1989.
A timely filed Petition for Rehearing was denied by the
Court of Appeals by Order entered May 22, 1989. Extensions of
time to file this Petition were granted until July 21 and July
28, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In May, 1983, a fire destroyed a building in Murray,
Utah, which housed both private and Salt Lake County government
offices.

Dean C. Larsen, Assistant Murray Fire Chief, inves-

tigated and concluded that the fire originated in a county office
owing to misuse of a space heater.

Ralph Tolman, (Petitioner),

was assigned by his boss, Don Harman, Chief Salt Lake County
Investigator, to also investigate the fire's cause and origin.
Tolman did so and orally reported his agreement with Larsen's
opinions.

Immediately thereafter, Tolman was relieved of the

investigation and the county hired an independent private fire
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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investigator, Jim Ashby, in his stead.

On June 6, 1983, Ashby

reported that his investigation resulted in a different conclusion; i.e., that the fire did not originate in county space nor
was it caused by the space heater.

State v. Tolman, 107 Utah

Adv. Rep. 61, 62, (para 2 ) , April 27, 1989 CA.
On August 1, 1983, Tolman submitted his seven page
report per his original opinion and provided a courtesy copy of
the report to Larsen, contrary to office policy.

Tolman's

supervisor rejected the report as did Harman, (after Tolman
refused to accept the other's rejection), who also ordered Tolman
to prepare a second report without any conclusions or opinions.
Fearing that his employment would be jeopardized if Harman
learned of the courtesy copy to Larsen, Tolman contacted Larsen
and told him about Harman's anger over the contents of his report
and of his tenuous job security and further asked him to conceal
the report so as to ensure Harman would not find out about it.
(107 Utah Adv. Rep. at 62, paragraph three.)
Tolman did; however, advise Larsen that they both
should tell the truth about the report and it's contents, other
then to Harman, (if Harman did take an action).

(Addendum K ) .

After vociferous objections to Harman's rejecting his
report, Tolman, on August 25, 1983, submitted a one-page "report"
which said virtually nothing of import and contained no opinions.
Harman approved and filed that report.

(At 62, paragraph 3).

The private tenants of the demised office building
brought a civil action against the county in 1984.
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Larsen was

deposed by plaintiffs1 counsel in November, 1984, but failed to
produce the seven-page Tolman report because he wanted to keep
Tolman out of trouble with Harman.

He did so without asking

Tolman or ever having spoken to him about the report since the
15-month-old discussion,

(Id.f at 62, para. 4.; Addendum C ) .

In 1986, a grand jury was called to investigate a range
of potential criminality involving public officials; this case
among them.

The "targets" were subpoenaed to testify with

accompanying written notices advising them of the specific nature
of potential charges.

Tolman, however, was among the group of

persons receiving "mere" witness subpoenas.

He appeared to

testify on April 9, 1986, and was met outside the jury room by
special prosecutors Rodney Snow and Larry Keller and their
investigator, Lorin Brooks.

He was then advised of his "target"

status but only with a generic reference to evidence tampering
involving the fire investigation.

He was afforded an opportunity

to speak with an attorney but advised that his lawyer could not
be present inside the jury room with him.

(All other targets and

witnesses were allowed to have inside counsel.)

The record

reflects no advisory of his privilege against self-incrimination.
Tolman at first expressed a desire to leave but opted to stay and
testify when advised that counsel would have to remain outside,
anyway.

He testified a second time to the same matters at a

later date.

(Paragraph 4 at 62, summary).

On October 9, 1986, Tolman was indicted for witness
tampering, evidence tampering, official misconduct and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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conspiracy.

He filed a number of pre-trial motions.

Those

denied which are pertinent hereto were motions seeking a preliminary hearing and a Bill of Particulars.

(Id.)

Following a three week trial, Tolman's motion to
dismiss the evidence tampering charge was granted.

The jury was

allowed to take Tolman's grand jury testimony into deliberation.
The jury voted to acquit both Defendants (Tollman and Harman) of
conspiracy; however, Tolman was convicted of felony witness
tampering and official misconduct, a misdemeanor.
reduced to a misdemeanor at sentencing.

The felony was

(Id.)

On appeal, the official misconduct conviction was
reversed, (insufficient evidence), but the conviction for tampering with a witness was affirmed.

(Id.)

(Harman's conviction was

reversed dji toto.)
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following questions are raised owing to Petitioner's assignment of error to the Court of Appeals panel's
affirmance of the verdict and decisions in trial court:
1.

Does the "right to appeal" include the right to a

written, responsive opinion on all issues properly raised?
2.

Were Petitioner's statutory and fundamental consti-

tutional rights violated before the grand jury and did the
panel's affirmance conflict with the decisions of this Court?
3.

Can the state constitutional provision regarding

preliminary hearing rights be "amended" by mere legislation?
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4.

Was the denial of a Bill of Particulars in direct

conflict with the holding of this Court in State v. Bell, infra?
5.

Is the Tampering With a Witness statute unconstitu-

tionally vague and/or overbroad?
6.

Does a verdict obtained from group prayer and

obeyance to the authority of the Mormon priesthood as conduit of
the pre-agreed dispositive revelation run afoul of the "chance"
or "outside influence" exceptions to non-impeachability?
7.

Did prosecutor misconduct prevent a fair trial?

8.

Was the evidence of Petitioner's guilt clearly

insufficient and was the panel's affirmance thereof

in conflict

with the same panel's decision in the companion case?
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW OF PETITIONER'S
CLAIMS WAS SO INCOMPLETE AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON APPEAL
Appellant's Brief(s) below carefully addressed eleven
substantive issues, any one of which, could require reversal.
The panel below ruled on only four of Appellant's
substantive claims of error.
The Court of Appeals has simply ignored the very
crucial issues this case raises by labeling them "without merit,"
(without explanation).

This type of "opinion" renders Petition-

er's "right to appeal in all cases" an empty guarantee.

Article

I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah.
Rule 30, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, requires
the majority opinion in a criminal case "shall" be in writing.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Both courts1 rules (at Rule 9 ) , admonish appellant's
counsel that a docketing statement which lists the basis for
appeal as, "the judgment of the trial court is not supported by
the law or the facts," is unacceptable.

It should be equally

unacceptable for the written opinion on appeal to be nothing more
than, "no merit."

How else can the aggrieved be assured that the

review of his claims was conscientious and thoughtful, as due
process requires.

(In accord People v. Rojas, 118 Cal. App. 278

(1981); Ex Parte Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83 (1981).
II. THE APPEALS COURT ERRED: PETITIONER'S GRAND
JURY TESTIMONY WAS OBTAINED AND ADMITTED UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
At trial and on appeal, Tolman argued that his grand
jury testimony should not have been admitted due to the state's
noncompliance with the Utah Code and constitutional rights
respecting notice, counsel and silence of an accused.
The Court of Appeals, in the instant case, (107 Utah
Adv. Rep. 61, 64), recites Utah Code Ann. §77-11-3, which
states, inter alia, that a grand jury "target" shall be advised
with particularity, of his target status, his right to the
presence of counsel and his privilege against self incrimination.
By finding no merit in this argument the panel ignored
evidence which clearly brings this case within the ambit of State
v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969 (Utah 1967), deciding apposite thereto.
Tolman claims plain error and relies again on the pleadings
submitted at trial.

(R. 188-191, 200-205; Addendum H.)
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Witness Brooks1 (grand jury investigator) notes indicate that upon being informed of his subject status, Tolman "was
prepared to testify as a witness not knowing he was being looked
at as a subject".

(R. 238.)

Brooks' testimony recalled that as

soon as Tolman was informed of his subject status, he stated,
"Color me gone".

(R. 537, T. 1027.)

Brooks testified that

Tolman was not given a complete Miranda warning outside the grand
jury room.

(R. 537, T. 1026.)

Nor do his notes reflect that

Tolman was ever informed outside the grand jury room of the
specific nature of the prospective charges.

(R. 238-240.)

Once before the grand jury, Tolman was told by the
prosecutor that his right to counsel meant counsel could not be
present with him in the jury room.

When asked if he had con-

ferred with counsel, he replied he had not since being informed
of his "subject" status.

(R. 244, 1. 18-23.)

The nature of the

investigation into tampering with evidence was mentioned, but
never was it clearly stated that Tolman was the "subject" of any
specific charges.

(R. 245, 1. 2-15.)

A "subject" is an "accused" and he must be fully
advised of all of his rights in light of the potential charges
against him.

Ruggeri, at 969.

The Ruggeri court makes two

observations absolutely pertinent hereto.

The first says:

(quoting People v. Tomasello, 48 Misc. 2d 156, 265 N.Y.S.2d 686),
[i]f a possible defendant or target of an
investigation is subpoenaed before a grand
jury and there testifies, whether or not he
claims or asserts his privilege against self
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incrimination, his constitutional privilege
is deemed violated. Id. at 690.
This statement indicates that the violation commences upon the
issuance of a subpoena to appear without notice of "subject"
status.

That Tolman was informed, however inadequately, of that

status moments prior to his appearance does not cure the defect.
Nor does Brooks ever say Tolman remained voluntarily.

"Color me

gone," evidences, however colloquially, a desire to vacate the
premises.

The special prosecutors' admonitions inside the grand

jury room ring hollow when they are closely scrutinized.
The second and equally compelling observation made by
the Ruggeri court has to do with waiver.

It states:

It would seem that a witness who is unaware
that he is a target of a grand jury investigation could not intelligently determine
whether or not he needed counsel unless he
was fully advised of the charges being
considered against him; and until he has a
full knowledge regarding that matter, he will
not know when to assert his constitutional
claim of privilege against selfincrimination. It would be difficult to
believe that he could intelligently waive the
right to counsel under such circumstances."
[Emphasis added.] 429 P.2d at 975.
The apparently universal standard for waiver of a
fundamental constitutional right is "knowing and intelligent".
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274
(1969); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32
L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).

This pertains both to the knowledge and

understanding of the actual rights involved and how they interface with the nature of the charge.

In this Court it means "real
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notice of the true nature of the charge against himf the first
and most universally recognized requirement of due process".
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 at 1312 (1987).

It would have

been impossible for Tolman to make a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his rights since the "real11 nature of the charges was
never explained to him.

To infer from the brief record of the

grand jury appearance what was meant by the cursory admonition is
to engage in the kind of speculation which Gibbons proscribes.
The error of the court in allowing segments of Tolmanfs grand
jury testimony to be read into the record during the State's case
in chief, was plain error of constitutional magnitude, which,
when read in light of the whole record, cannot be said to be
harmless.

State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987).
The Tolman opinion also should have considered consti-

tutional principles of due process and equal protection but it
ignores the fact that of all the grand jury targets, Tolman was
the only one who was not given advance written notice of his
status; the only one who was not told of the specific nature of
the charges; the only one who was advised that his attorney would
have to wait outside the grand jury room; and, was in fact the
only witness whose attorney was not allowed in the room.
Neither can one waive the right to counsel when he is
expressly misled as to what it is.

It is pure speculation to

assume he would have waived the right if properly explained.
Further, the panel completely failed to recognize the
privilege against self incrimination.

It is not the same as the
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Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Nowhere does the record show

that Tolman waived the right to silence.

Nor could he know what

to be silent about without knowing the nature of the charges.
III. DENIAL OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
The trial court erred in denying Petitioner's request
for a preliminary hearing, as did the Court of Appeals in affirming.

Article I, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived
by the accused with the consent of the State,
or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. (Emphasis
added.)
Although the constitution provides that following

indictment a preliminary hearing is optional, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 7(c), states that a preliminary examination shall not be held if the defendant is indicted.
The Court rejected Petitioner's argument on this point,
asserting the presumption of constitutionality of a statute doctrine, requiring a statute be found to "clearly violate some
constitutional provision.

Tolman at 64.

(Citations omitted.)

The Tolman panel reasons that since Article I, Section
13 does not require a hearing, the legislature has the power to
prohibit such hearings.

(Id.)

How can it not be a conflict for the constitution to
say the hearing may be held and the statute to say it may not be?
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Rule 7(c) is a constitutional amendment which renders the constitutional provision completely emasculated.
Article XXIII of the constitution, however, prohibits
any amendments by customary legislative enactment and prescribes
a lengthy process which includes a referendum.
Where other discovery processes were also denied, this
issue is even more critical, especially where objectionable
hearsay was freely admitted on the conspiracy charge.
IV. DENIAL OF THE PRE-TRIAL MOTION FOR
A BILL OF PARTICULARS IS CLEAR ERROR
Tolman filed a Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, motion and memorandum for a Bill of Particulars to
seek information about the nature and cause of the charges
against him owing to the broad and ambiguous charging language in
the Indictment and sought information not contained in the
indictment, which later proved proximate to Tolman1s convictions.
(R. 64-67, 89-90, 275-276; Addendum I).

He argued below that to

rule adversely would deny him information sufficient to prepare
his defense.

State v. Jameson, 103 U. 129, 134 P.2d 173 (1943);

State v. Strand, (on remand) 720 P.2d 425 (1986).

See State v.

Solomon, 93 U. 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1937).
By failing to grant a Bill of Particulars the trial
court wrongly failed to limit or circumscribe the area, field or
transaction as to which the special prosecutors were allowed to
offer "evidence."

See State v. Spencer, 101 U. 287, 121 P.2d 912
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(1942), overruled on other grounds, 4 U.2d 404, 295 P.2d 345
(1956).
Only a month before oral argument in the Court of
Appeals, this Court decided State v. Bell, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. 22
(S.Ct., September 30, 1988), the dispositive authority on point.
In Bell the prosecution did not provide information called for in
a Bill of Particulars.
The Bell decision placed heavy burdens on the state's
justifying opposition to a Bill of Particulars and narrow limits
on a trial courtfs discretion to deny the motion.

The trial

judge in Tolman made no findings to support his denial, nor did
the prosecution even come close to meeting the Bell test.
Bell is in direct conflict with the order of Judge Uno
and the summary affirmance of the panel.

It is a mystery why so

clear a case, directly on point, could be ignored.
V.

76-8-508(1)(b) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Tolman*s conviction on Count IV, "Tampering With a
Witness," was predicated upon conduct which is not clearly
proscribed by §76-8-508(1)(b).
inform what JL£ prohibited.

The law fails to adequately

Even if the law is constitutional,

the court nevertheless erred in failing to instruct the jury that
acts toward withholding of evidence must be intended to cause it
to be withheld from the official proceeding he believes is
pending.
A.

The Statute is Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth.

Tolman was convicted of violating 76-8-508(1)(b):
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A person is guilty of a felony in the third
degree if:
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
* * *

(b) Withhold any testimony, information,
document or thing; . . •
That portion of the statute is unconstitutionally vague
and overly broad.

Subpart (b) mandates what may not be withheld

but not the "what" it cannot be withheld from.

Presumably, the

legislature meant "withheld" from the "official proceeding
believed to be pending or about to be instituted."

The absence

of some clear nexus between subpart (b) and subsection (1) makes
it a crime to have a belief coupled with an unrelated act.
One could violate the statute by believing that an
Immigrations hearing was occurring in Seattle while hiding from
his wife his affair with their neighbor in Tooele.
The undisputed evidence herein shows that Tolman asked
Larsen to withhold not the report, but to withhold from Harman
the fact that Tolman had him given the report; not to keep it
from Ashby's investigation or the civil suit (without a Bill of
Particulars, one can only guess which one), but only from Harman,
/2
so he wouldn't get in trouble for violating office policy.
No nexus of intent and official proceeding exists.
The statute is so plainly unconstitutional that the
court's failure to address the issue is clear error.

State v.

Laird, 601 P.2d 926, 927, n.6 (1979); see Page v. United States,
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282 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1960).

At trial, Tolman objected to the

statute-based instruction, claiming it created an offense out of
a mere belief coupled with an unrelated act.

(R. 532, T. 1428.)

It is inexplicable that the panel summarily rejected
the constitutionality issue which is so crucial that it may be
raised at any time, remotely so, or even sua sponte.

(Laird,

supra); (State v. Fritt, 463 P.2d 806 (Utah 1970)). The test is,
"if the person's liberty is at stake."

State v. Breckenridge,

688 P.2d 440 (1983); In Re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 384 P.2d 110
(1963).

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 (1986); State v. Schad,

supra; State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445 (1965).
State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512 (Utah 1981), held that,
"[I]n order to find a statute unconstitutionally vague, this
court must determine that it 'failed to inform an ordinary
citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought
to be prescribed.1"

Ld. at 515, citing State v. Bradshaw, 541

P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1975). /3
An ordinary citizen, reading the subject statute, would
be unclear as to what the word, "thing," meant and certainly
could not determine what act relates to what proceeding.

"There

is no doubt that a statute that affects fundamental liberties is
unconstitutional if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning."

State v.

Lindquist, 674 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1983); In Re Boyer, 636 P.2d
1085, 1088 (Utah 1971); State v. Packard, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah
1952).

"When a state action impinges on fundamental rights, due
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4

In
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VI.

BOTH COURTS BELOW ERRED ON THE
ISSUES RE: "GOD" AND THE JURY

The only facts on the jury prayer issue are those
contained in the affidavits of juror Karl Anderson.
J-1 and J-2.)

(Addendum

But both courts below have overlooked the real

issues, all of which are compatible with the authority cited in
the Tolman opinion at page 65:
Generally, a juror affidavit can only be used
to impeach a jury verdict when: 1) the
verdict was determined by chance or bribery,
Rosenlof v, Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah
1983); Hillier v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300, 304
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); or 2) when extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or an outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror. Utah R. Evid. 606(b); State v.
DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988);
Hillier, 740 P.2d at 304.
The facts in Tolman are easily distinguished from
DeMille.

It was "the priesthood" not prayer or God which pur-

ports to usurp the court's authority.
The Tolman jury, however, violated both Rule 606(b)
exceptions, first by agreeing iji advance to vote however the
prayerleader said God answered his prospective prayer.

In

violation of their oaths, they submitted the verdict to one
juror's non-evidentiary "revelation".

Unlike the juror in

DeMille, there was no need for post-prayer persuasion since those
who acquiesced to the authority of the priesthood did so in
advance.

That is as much based upon "chance" as a coin flip.
The second issue is more disturbing.

Despite the

decisions of the courts below; despite media reports; despite
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The trial record is also replete with the prosecution's
repeated and intentional attempts to conceal witness testimony,
block discovery, intimidate witnesses and mislead the jury.

(R.

59, 60, 128-134, 1037-1055, 1160-1219, 1184.)
Keller even told the jury that Tolman could testify if
he wanted his side of the story heard.
1225.)

(R. 460, 470, 1205,

Tolman's motion for a mistrial was denied by the court.

The damage required Tolman to take the stand.
A small sampling of the pertinent case law is:

State

v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977), comments about the assertion
of a privilege or non-testimony warrants reversal if any doubt of
prejudice exists; State v. Jerrell, 808 P.2d 18 (Utah 1980) and
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), nondisclosure of
exculpatory evidence or Rule 16 (discovery) materials reversible
error.

(See also, State v. Bell, supra.)
Pages 29 to 42 of Appellant's Brief in the Court of

Appeals fully sets forth the facts and the law on these issues.
VIII. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR WITNESS TAMPERING
The undisputed record simply cannot support the conviction herein.

In fact, one only has to read the entire testi-

mony of Larsen to conclude that the verdict is not supported by
the evidence.
The panel's reasoning is so flawed that it seems
impossible for them to have read Larsenfs testimony.
1.

Official Proceeding:
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A < :1 d e n N :)

reasonable juror could have inferred guilt from that testimony,
Larsen clearly states that Tolman always told him to tell the
truth but Larsen decided, on his own, to withhold his knowledge
of the report.

If this Court does nothing but read that adden-

dum, this case will be reversed and remanded for entry of acquittal.
It is undisputed that Tolman actually welcomed the
disclosure of his investigative findings and only sought to
destroy one of numerous identical copies of the report for
reasons totally unrelated to the independent investigation of
Ashby or the civil suit.

He, in fact, is the "whistleblower" who

brought the whole matter to the media.
proceeding?

And what is an official

Certainly not a civil tort action.

"Official"

proceedings are those which are done in the execution of the
duties of public office, strictly within the statutory jurisdiction of government.

(See §76-8-201, et seq.)
CONCLUSION

For any one of the foregoing bases a writ should issue.
DATED this

^A

day of July, 1989.

JD
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
J
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
Jf day of July, 1989, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/? w^th postage
prepaid fully thereon, to the Utah Attorney General, j236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
^A
\
I
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FOOTNOTES
The importance of the limitless use of "evidence," especially
the admission of hearsay, without deciding the preliminary
question of conspiracy is underscored and is necessarily part and
parcel of this issue. Tolman was acquitted of conspiracy yet the
abundance of otherwise inadmissible evidence was heard by the
jury which convicted him of direct offenses. See complete
argument in Tolman (Appellant's) Brief; Harman (Appellant's)
Brief (supra); Utah Court of Appeals.)
?t

T'he undisputed testimony is that Tolman freely discussed the
report and his opinions with the independent investigators; that
Harman and others had copies of the report; that the original was
kept in Tolman1s regular file; that once the suit commenced the
county attorneys refused to give up the Tolman report based on a
w o r k prodi ict

theory.

The Carlsen court cited a statute similar to Utah's which had
been upheld against constitutional challenges in State v. Stroh,
91 Wash.2d 580, 588 P.2d 1182 (1979). Stroh construes a statute
which is drafted ii i a way to foreclose any argument of vagueness
or overbreadth. In Stroh, the court ruled that the statute need
not expressly include as an element the intent to obstruct
justice, since the legislature determined that "attempts to
influence a witness to change his testimony or to absent himself
from a trial or other official proceeding, necessarily r- v^ ~~
their purpose and it is their natural tendency to obstr^o'^
justice"
"The intent to perform the acts proscribed by the
statute, w i t I knowledge or reason to believe that the person is
or probabl; is about to be called as a witness, conclusively
shows an intent to obstruct justice". [Emphasis added ] Id
I
He1d:
R u 1 e 1 9 ( c ) , U t a h R u 1 e s of C r i m i n a 1 P r o c e d u r e i n d i c a t e s
11: i a t e r r o r m a y b e a s s i g n e d t o a i I i n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o r w i t h o u t

object] on.

A
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I) E T E RMINATI V'E AUTHOR!TIES

'"'

• • " ••

* 'icle I r Section 1 2 , Utah Constitution, [Rights of accused
11 i criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person •
and by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,, to
hc ve a speedy public trial by an impar t i a J
jii iry of the county or district in which the
: • ffense is alleged to have been committed,
c ,:i: i' ::!! the right to appeal in all cases. In no
:i i i, = t a nee shall any accused person, before
f::! i ia] judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
g :i F e evidence against himself; a w i f e shall
i Ic • t be compe1led t o t e s t if y a gain s t her
husband, nor a husband against his w i f e , nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense,
Article I, Section 1 3 , Utah Constitutioi l, [ Prosecut i o n b y i i: I £ o i
mation or indictment - Grand j u r y . ] .
Offenses h e r e t o fore required t o be pros e cut e d
by indictment, shall be prosecuted by inforLon after examination and commitment by a
1st-rate, unless the examination be waived
-;he accused with the consent of the State,
or by indictment, with or without such
examination and commitment. The formatioi I of
the grand jury and the powers and duties
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.
Ar t i d e X X I I I , Utah Constitution
Sect. __._.

L Amendments : proposal, electioi I . ]
1

amendment or amendments to
i may be proposed in either
islature, and if two-thirds
members elected to each of the

this Constituhouse of the
of all the
two houses,
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shall vote in favor thereof, such proposed
amendment or amendments shall be entered on
their respective journals with the yeas and
nays taken thereon; and the Legislature shall
cause the same to be published in ab least
one newspaper in every county of the state,
where a newspaper is published, for two
months immediately preceding the next general
election, at which time the said amendment or
amendments shall be submitted to the electors
of the state for their approval or rejection,
and if a majority of the electors voting
thereon shall approve the same, such amendment or amendments shall become part of this
Constitution.
The revision or amendment of an entire
article or the addition of a new article to
this Constitution may be proposed as a single
amendment and may be submitted to the electors as a single question or proposition.
Such amendment may relate to one subject, or
any number of subjects, and may modify, or
repeal provisions contained in other articles
of the Constitution, if such provisions are
germane to the subject matter of the article
being revised, amended or being proposed as a
new article.
Section 2, [Revision of the Constitution.]
Whenever two-thirds of the members, elected
to each branch of the Legislature, shall deem
it necessary to call a convention to revise
or amend this Constitution, they shall
recommend to the electors to vote, at the
next general election, for or against a
convention, and, if a majority of all the
electors, voting at such election, shall vote
for a convention, the Legislature, at its
next session, shall provide by law for
calling the same. The convention shall
consist of not less than the number of
members in both branches of the Legislature.
Section 3, [Submission to electors.]
No Constitution, or amendments adopted by
such convention, shall have validity until
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submitted t o., a i i d a d o p t e d b y , a, i na j o r i t y o f
the electors of the State voting at the next
general election.
Constitution. of _t he United S t a t e s, Amen d m e n t_ VI, [.Rights of
accused.]
x.

•--• * , w

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
*- • al, by an impartial iury of the State and
-rict wherein the crime shall have been
fitted, which district shall have been
viously ascertained by law, and to be
*~- "* of the nature and cause of the
*>T\% t •> be confronted with the wit.?e:= against him; to have compulsory
- - obtaining witnesses in his favor,
nave the Assistance of couns< " f*** his
ense.
•
Section 7 0 _ z _ x U J , uer mitions
intentionally, or with i i itei it.
or willf ully" ; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; " recklessly 9 o r
maliciously"; and "criminal n<egiig*ence or criminally negli gent.
o

h • ^yan^

f

engages i n conduct:

. tr 11 c J. u 11 a 1 1 y , O I 'w I L I : .i:.. L e n L

- r A ..

Ly with respect to the nature of hie
c o n d u c• i r
a res u 11 o f h i s c o n d i: o t, when
nis conscious objective or desire :
*
• in the conduct or canpp f-h-> - P S
'

Kn,
wiLh knowledge- .. ,i;
>ect „. ,.„ ... .duct or to circjn..tances
•oundinq his conduct when he is aware of
•s conduct or the existing
A person acts knowingly, ur
wit
tf:th
respect to a result of
onduct 1 vwhen he is aware that h.s conduct
^sonab ~ ;*-^ - j r * -* - * ^ ^ >--»*•
(3) :*•.-<
or maliciously, wi*:h respect
to circu
s surrounding his conduct or
the resu .
is conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards -; r. ibsta-.t ia 1 ;i"jc
nil istifiable risk that the circumstances
ex -5t or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a *:ro--s iev.arion from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the standard of care that an ordinary person
would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree
that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
Section 76-8-201, Official misconduct - Unauthorized acts or
failure of duty.
A public servant is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor if, with an intent to benefit
himself or another or to harm another, he
knowingly commits an unauthorized act which
purports to be an act of his office, or
knowingly refrains from performing a duty
imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in
the nature of his office.
Section 76-8-508, Tampering with witness - Retaliation against
witness or informant - Bribery.
A person is guilty of a felony of the third
degree if:
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to:
* * *

(b) Withhold any testimony, information,
document, or thing; or . . .
Section 77-11-3, Evidence receivable - Witness to be advised of
rights.
(1) The grand jury shall receive no other
evidence than is given by witnesses under
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oath or affirmation, or documentary evidence,
or the deposition of a witness taken as
provided by law. The grand jury shall
r e c e i v e o n 1 y 1 e g a ] e v i d e n c e,

(2) Any person c a11e d t o t e s t ify before t h e
grand jury may be advised of his right to be
represented by counsel. If a witness is or
becomes a ir.b ject of the investigation, he
shall be advised />t: t bat fact and of his • •
right to counsel, and of his privilege
against self incrimination. On demand of a
witness for representation by counsel, the
proceedings shall be delayed until counsel is
present. In the event that counsel of the
witness 1 choice is not available, he shall be
required t o o bt a in or a c c e p t o t h e r c o u n s e1.
Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
When facts not set out in an inforn tation or
indictment are required to inform a defendant
of the nature and cause of the offense
charged, so as to enable him to prepare his
defense, the defendant may file a written
motion for a b i11 o f p art i c u1ars. Th e mot ion
shall be filed at arraignment or within ten
days thereafter, <~>r at; such la*;er time as the
u
court may permit
e court rr-ay, on its own
motion, r.ir« • - h- :":Iirig of .- bill of
particuiarz * A b A U of particulars may !:: e •
amended or supplemented at anv time subjec t
to such conditions as justice may require.
^ e request for and contents of a bill of
- .ticulars shall be limited • o a statement
of factual information rneeded
io set forth
the essential elerv^r^.- c -"'
~arti cular
offense charged,
Ru 1 e 7 (c) , Utah Rules of Cr iini i Ia 1_ Procedure .
If a defendant is charged with a felony, he
shall not be called on to plead before the
committing magistrate. During the initial
appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of hi s r:i ght to a
preliminary examination. If the defendant
waives his right to a preliminary examination, and the prosecuting attorney
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

consents, the magistrate shall forthwith
order the defendant bound over to answer in
the district court. If the defendant does
not waive a preliminary examination, the
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary
examination. Such examination shall be held
within a reasonable time, but in any event
not later than ten days if the defendant is
in custody for the offense charged and not
later than 30 days if he is not in custody;
provided, however, that these time periods
may be extended by the magistrate for good
cause shown. A preliminary examination shall
not be held if the defendant is indicted.
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure - Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon
request the following material or information
of which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements
of the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the
defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or
mitigate the degree of the offense for
reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which the
court determines on good cause shown should
be made available to the defendant in order
for the defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges and before the defendant is
required to plead. The prosecutor has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
•

*

*

(g) If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of
the court that a party has failed to comply
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with this rule, the court may order such
party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party
from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems
just under the circumstances.
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object,
error may be assigned to instructions in
order to avoid a manifest injustice.
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a
verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
his or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing him to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or indictment or concerning his
mental processes in connection therewith,
except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence
of any statement by him concerning a matter
about which he would be precluded from
testifying be received for these purposes.
Rule 9, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Docketing statement.
(c) Content of docketing statement. The
docketing statement shall contain the
following information in the order set forth
below:
* * *

(5) The issues presented by the appeal,
expressed in the terms and circumstances of
the case, but without unnecessary detail.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The questions should not be repetitious.
General conclusory statements, such as "the
judgment of the trial court is not supported
by the law or facts," are not acceptable.
Rule 9, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Docketing Statement.
(c) Content of docketing statement. The
docketing statement shall contain the
following information in the order set forth
below:
*

*

•

(5) The issues presented by the appeal,
expressed in terms and circumstances of the
case, but without unnecessary detail. The
questions should not be repetitious. General
conclusory statements, such as "the judgment
of the trial court is not supported by the
law or facts," are not acceptable.
Rule 30, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Decision of the
court: Dismissal; notice of decision.
(c) Decision and opinion in writing; entry
of decision. When a judgment, decree, or
order is reversed, modified, or affirmed by
the court, the reasons therefor shall be
stated concisely in writing and filed with
the clerk. Any judge on the panel concurring
or dissenting therefrom may likewise give the
reasons in writing and file the same with the
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records
of the court shall constitute the entry of
the judgment of the court.
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cause" for refusing an employment referral
was unreasonable and irrational given the
Department's rule which includes economic
factors as a basis for "good cause" and given
the economic imperatives which plaintiffs
faced.
RETIREMENT RULE
As noted above, the dispositive rule states
that "[g]ood cause for failure to obtain an
available job" may also be established by
showing "the elements which establish good
cause for quitting a job ...." Utah Admin. R.
475-5c-7 (1987-88). The rule detailing
"good cause" for quitting a job expressly
provides that "P]eaving work solely to accept
retirement benefits is not a compelling reason
for quitting." Utah Admin. R. 475-5a-7(9)
(1987-88).
However, the latter rule is inapplicable to
the cases before us. Plaintiffs did not refuse
the referral to accept retirement benefits.
Commencement of those benefits was as much
as two years away. Plaintiffs refused the referral to preserve the ultimate availability of
the retirement benefits. The purpose of the
rule is to avoid "double-dipping," an interpretation supported by other language in the
rule stating that "[although it may be reasonable for an individual to take advantage of a
retirement benefit, payment of unemployment
benefits in such a circumstance would not be
consistent with the intent of the Unemployment Insurance program." Id. This language
clearly contemplates the impropriety of simultaneous receipt of retirement and unemployment benefits, a result which is not present in
this case and is specifically eschewed by plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs had good cause to reject the
Department's referrals to BM&T. Plaintiffs
were entitled to unemployment compensation
during the interim period between being laid
off and, as applicable in individual cases,
either commencement of their USX retirement
benefits, commencement of other employment,
or exhaustion of unemployment benefits in the
ordinary course. These cases are remanded to
the Board of Review for calculation and
award of the unemployment benefits to which
plaintiffs are entitled.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge

P.2d 626, 630 (Utah 1977) ("such cause as would
similarly affect persons of reasonable and normal
sensitivity").
3. Plaintiffs claim there was substantial risk involved in working for BM&T because BM&T was
merely a group of five attorneys with very little
relevant experience. Of course, the success BM&T
has in fact had cannot be allowed to color our assessment of how the situation would reasonably have
looked to plaintiffs at the time.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Ralph TOLMAN, Claude Donald Harman,
Defendants and Appellant.
No. 870407-CA
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Third District, Salt Lake County
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ATTORNEYS:
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City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent
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Greenwood.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Ralph Tolman (Tolman) appeals from his
conviction of tampering with a witness, a class
A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §76-8-508 (1978), and official misconduct, a class B misdemeanor in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-201 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
Tolman raises numerous issues on appeal,
including whether: 1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; 2) the trial
court erred in ruling that Tolman was not
entitled to a preliminary hearing: 3) the trial
court erred in admitting a transcript of
Tolman's grand jury testimony at trial; and 4)
the trial court erred in failing to consider juror
affidavits concerning one juror's" alleged
divine revelation. We affirm the conviction of
witness tampering and reverse the conviction
of official misconduct.

1. This distinction having been made, the Board
held that plaintiffs were entitled to retain benefits
I. FACTS
they had received up to the time of their respective
"In setting out the facts from the record on
referrals.
2. As a general proposition, "good cause" in the appeal, we resolve all conflicts and doubts in
context of unemployment compensation is determ- favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of
ined objectively. Denby v. Board of Review, 567
—
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the trial court." State v. Bab bell, 103 Utah
Adv. Rep. 14, 14 (March 3, 1989). Our statement of the facts, therefore, is set forth in
conformance with Babbell.
In May 1983, a fire at the Fashion Place
Professional Plaza in Murray, Utah caused
extensive damage to the offices of the Salt
Lake County mental health department. Dean
C. Larsen (tztfGQT), Assistant Chief and Fire
Marshall for the Murray City Fire Department, investigated the fire and reported that it
originated in the mental health offices and was
caused by misuse of a space heater and extension cord. The next day, Evan Stephens
(Stephens), risk manager for Salt Lake
County, asked the county attorney's office to
investigate the fire. Claude Donald Harman
(Harman), chief investigator for the county
attorney's office, assigned Tolman and investigator Olin Yearby (Yearby) to assist in
determining the cause and origin of the fire.
Tolman and Yearby met with Larsen at the
fire scene and investigated the fire. Afterwards, Tolman informed Stephens that he
agreed with Larsen that the fire originated in
the county offices. Stephens, who was concerned about the county's liability for the fire if
it originated in the county's offices, wrote a
letter to Harman, stating he was hiring Jim
Ashby (Ashby) of Global Investigations to
perform an independent investigation of the
fire. Shortly thereafter, Tolman and Yearby
ceased their investigation. In the meantime, a
laboratory analyzed the extension cord and
space heater and provided a report which
stated that the heater could not have caused
the fire because it was not energized at the
time of the fire. On June 6, 1983, Ashby
concluded that based on the laboratory analysis and his investigation, the fire originated in
the attic above the county offices.

CODE*co
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opinion as to the fire's origin. Harman approved and filed the report.
In 1984, civil litigation regarding the fire
was initiated. In November 1984, Larsen received a subpoena duces tecum requesting him
to appear at a deposition with all records and
documents relating to the fire at the Fashion
Place Professional Plaza. Larsen did not
produce Tolman's seven-page report at the
heA
deposition because he did not want to cause
ise/
Tolman any problems. Larsen was again*
deposed in November 1985 and revealed the
existence of TolmanTs seven-'pa^e report.
In 1986, a grand jury was called l o investigate possible criminal charges related to the
alleged cover-up of reports regarding the
1983 fire at the Fashion Place Professional
Plaza. On|Apnr9T1I?86) Tolman was called to
testify befoTFTRe^fand jury. Prior to Tolman
testifying, special prosecutors Rodney Snow
and Larry Keller, and grand jury investigator
Lorin C Brooks met Tolman outside the
grand jury room ajid advised him that he was
the subject of thejrandjury inquiry. Tolman
stated that he did not realize he was a subject.
Snow and Keller then told Tolman that he had
the right to have counsel present outside_the
courtroom, that lie could talk to an attorney
before testifying, and that he could contact an
attorney at any time during his testimony.
Tolman said he had an attorney and that he
was aware of his rights. He also stated he was
willing to appear, despite the prosecutors'
oTter to postpone his testimony. Tolman then
took the witness stand, acknowledged that he
had a right to counsel, and was informed that
the investigation concerned the report he prepared regarding the fire at the Fashion Place
Professional Plaza. About a month later,
Tolman was again subpoenaed to testify
before the grand jury and informed of his
right to.couns.gL. __
OnjOctober 9, 1986.Ahe grand jury indicted
Tolman lor tampering with evidence, tampering with a witness, official misconduct and
criminal conspiracy. Prior to trial, Tolman's
motion for a preliminary hearing was denied.
After a three week trial, the jury retired to
deliberate, portions of^ Tolman's £rand iurv
transcript were permitted to be taken intojhe
jury room. The jury convicted Tolman of
tampering with a witness and official miscojiduxt. inis appeal followed.
"
"

On August 1, 1983, Tolman submitted a
seven-page report on the fire to his supervisor, Sam Dawson. The report concluded that
the fire originated in the mental health department's offices ."^Dawson rejected the report.
Hi Tolman's insistence, Dawson sent the
report to Harman. Harman also rejected the
report and_ordered Tolman to prepare another
rjeporj^/cpntrary, to tne county attorney^
/?ffice policy- of not releasing reports outsii
lice prior to approval bv a supervisor
| Tolman sent a copy of the seven-page repqr^
L to Larsen./The frstimony is confiictyigjggar
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
ffether Tolman^ent the rego^ro^arsen
On appeal, Tolman claims the evidence was
Je *or after (>fatman rejected it. ro any
fenu/^fter Harman rejected the report, insufficient to support his convictions. When
Tolman contacted Larsen. told him that reviewing whether evidence is sufficient to
Harman was angry about the contents of the support a jury conviction,
we review the evidence and all infreport and asked him to destroy the report.
erences which may reasonably be
Tolman also informed Larsen that he,
drawn from it in the light most
Tolman, could get into trouble for releasing
favorable to the verdict of the jury.
the report to Larsen. On August 25, 1983,
We reverse a jury conviction for
Tolman, submitted a one-page report on the
Digitizedfire
by the
W. Hunter
Library,
Reuben Clark
to Howard
Harman,
whichLaw
did
not J.include
an Law School, BYU.
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insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, jg sufficiently
inconclusive nr inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985) (quoting State v. Pctree, 659 P.2d 443,
444 (1983); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 479
(Utah 1988). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury as it is the "exclusive
province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence."
Steele v. Brienhoh, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); Booker, 709 P.2d at 345.
A. Witness Tampering
Our first inquiry is whether the evidence was
sufficient to support Tolman's conviction of
tampering with a witness under Utah Code
Ann. §76-8-508 (1978). Section 76-8508 states:
^X person is guilty of a felony of the
third degree if:
/j")U) Believing that an official procl/W J eeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted, he attempts
I to induce or otherwise cause a
person to:
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing....
In order to satisfy the elements of section 768-508^ the prosecution had to demonstrate
that:QTJ) Tolman believed that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about
to be instituted. See, e.g., State v. Bradley,
752 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1988) (stating that
section 76-8-508 does not require proof that
an official investigation or proceeding was
pending, but only that defendant believed such
an investigation or proceeding was pending);
and Q p Tolman knowingly or intentionally
attempted to induce or otherwise cause
another person to withhold any testimony,
information, document, or thing. )
In this case, Tolman was assigned to investigate the fire at the Fashion Place Professional Plaza and met with Yearby and Larsen at
the scene of the fire to determine its cause.
Tolman subsequently prepared an investigation
report. Based on these facts, a juror could
reasonably conclude Tolman believed that an
official investigation was pending. In addition,
Larsen testified that Tolman instructed him to
destroy the report. Subsequently, Larsen withheld Tolman*s seven-page report from a
civil proceeding despite a subpoena duces
tecum requiring him to produce the report.
Larsen testified that he did not produce the
~rt because he did not want to cause pTorepor
Pjems tor Tolman. Based on that testimony,
Clems
tne jury could reasonably conclude that

63

Tolman induced Larsen to withhold the report
from an official investigation or proceeding.
Although contrary evidence was presented,
w
[t|he existence of contradictory evidence or
conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing tnVjury's verdict." Id. We, therefore,
conclude that the record contains sufficient
evidence from which the jury could conclude
that Tolman knowingly or intentionally atte-T
mpted to induce Larsen to withhold the seven- L
page report from an official investigation or C
proceeding. Thus, we affirm 'loiman's conv-/
iction for witness tampering.
B. Official Misconduct
We next consider whether the evidence is
sufficient to support Tolman's conviction of
official misconduct. Utah Code Ann. §76-8201 (1978) states:
A public servant is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor if, with an intent to
benefit _ himself or anoTheT^of to
harm anotheTj FTe ITn o w i n g 1 y
commits an unauthorized act which
purports to be an act of his office,
or knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law
or clearly innerent in the nature of
his office.
*
To demonstrate a violation of section 76-8201, the proseaition was required to prove
that Tolman: ( t / acted in his capacity as a
public servant; @$ acted with an intent to
benefit himself or another or to harm another;
and^yknowingly committed an unauthorized
act which purported to be an act of his office
or knowingly refrained from performing a
duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his officeJWe can find
no evidence in the record to establish the third
element, that Tolman committed an unauthprized act which purported to be an act of his
officejAlthough Tolman may have committed
an unauthorized act by distributing the sevenpage report to Larsen in violation of office
policy, there is no evidence that Tolman's act
purported to be an act of his office. In fact,
Larsen testified that Tolman told him he
would be in trouble if Harman knew Larsen
had received the report. In addition, we find
no evidence that Tolman Tcnowmgly refrained
from performing a duty imposed by lay or
innerent injhe nature ot ms otlice. 1 herefore,
because we find no evidence in the record to
satisfy all elements of section 76-8-201, we
reverse Tolman's conviction for official misconduct.
III. PRELIMINARY HEARING
Tolman also claims the trial court erred in
denying his request for a preliminary hearing.
Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
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Offenses heretofore required to be
prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after
examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination
be waived by the accused with the
consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment.
(Emphasis added).
Although the constitution provides that
following indictment anVxamination and
commitment by a magistrate ys optional, Ijtah
R. Crim. P. 7{c) states that a preliminary
examination shall not be held if the defendant
is indicted. Tolman claims that the statute
clearly conflicts with the constitution and is,
therefore, unconstitutional. In order for a
statute to "Be declared'unconstitutional, a
statute must "clearly violate some constitutional provision, and further, the violation must
be clear, complete and unmistakable." Trade
Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21
Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958, 961 (1968); see
also Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah
1981). In examining statutory constitutionality,
the court must apply every reasonable presumption favoring constitutionality, acknowledging the legislative prerogative to enact laws.
Id. at 962; Timpanogos Planning v. Central
Utah Water, 690 P.2d 562, 564-65 (Utah
1984). In addition, those who assert that a
statute is unconstitutional bear the burden of
demonstrating that it is unconstitutional. Rio
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d
184, 191 (Utah 1984).
Article I, section 13 provides that a preliminary hearing may be held after prosecution
by indictment, but is not required. The
statute, however, states that a preliminary
hearing shall not be held if a defendant is
indicted. The constitution allows the legislature the discretion, therefore, to prohibit
preliminary hearings after indictment, and
such prohibition falls within the constitutional
language. As a result, the statute is not in
direct conflict with the constitution.
IV. GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Tolman also asserts that the trial court erred
in failing to suppress his grand jury testimony
at trial. Tolman claims that his grand jury
testimony was inadmissible because he was not
informed of his right to counsel nor wajjie
informed that he was the target of the investigation prior to'^TestiTying before the grand
jury.
"
~""^
In reviewing a trial court's evidentiary
rulings, we defer to the trial court's advantageous position and will not overturn its decisions absent an abuse of discretion. Whitehead
v. American Motors Sales Corp., 101 Utah
Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Feb. 2, 1989).
Utah Code Ann. §77-11-3 (1982) prov-
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ides:
Any person called to testify before
the grand jury may be advised of
his right to be represented by
counsel. If a witness is or becomes
a subject of the investigation, he
shall be advised of that fact and of
his right to counsel, and of his
rivilege against self incrimination. ^
n demand of a witness for representation by counsel, the proceedings shall be delayed until counsel is
present.
In State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d
969, 975 (1967), the Utah Supreme Court
stated that a witness, who was unaware that
he was a target of a grand jury investigation,
could not intelligently determine whether or
not he needed counsel where Jie_ was_jiot
advised of the charges against himTlnH'uggeri, >^
tfie witness testifie1T~T>efore* the grand
jury and was later indicted for alleged perjury
committed during his grand jury testimony.
The court held that because the witness was
not aware that he was a target of the grand
jury proceeding, the trial court properly excluded his grand jury testimony in his perjury
trial. Id.
In this case, special prosecutors Rodney
Snow and Larry Keller, and grand jury investigator Lorin C. Brooks met Tolman outside
the grand jury room prior to his testimony
and advised him that he was the subject o.£ the
grand jury inquiry. Tolman responded that he
did not realize he was a subject. Snow and
Keller then told Tolman that he had the right
to have counsel present outside the courtroom, r
that he could talk to an attorney before testifying, and that if he wanted to contact an
attorney at any time he could. Tolman responded that he had an attorney and that he was
aware of his rights. He also stated he was
willing to appear despite the prosecutors'
offer to postpone his testimony. Tolman then
took the witness stand and acknowledged that
he had a right to counsel. About a month
later, when Tolman again testified before the
grand jury, he was again informed of his right
to counsel. Unlike Ruggeri, Tolman knew he
was a/target/of the grand jury investigation,
prior to testifying-. In addition, he was intormed of his right to counsel. Therefore, we
hold that the trial court did not err in admitting Tolman's grand jury testimony into evidence.

i

V. JUROR AFFIDAVITS
Tolman also asserts that his motion to arrest
judgment should have been granted because a
juror affidavit established that the verdict
resulted from a divine revelation. Tolman
contends that the trial court erred in ruling
that the affidavit failed to show that an improper outside influence was present in the jury
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room.
Generally, a juror affidavit can only be used
to impeach a jury verdict when.^lythe verdict
was determined by chance or bribery, Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah
1983); Hillier v. Lambom.J240 P.2d 300, 304
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); orgywhen "extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or an outside
influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b); State
v. DeMUlc, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988); Hillier,
740 P.2d at 304. The reason for narrowly limiting the circumstances under which
jury affidavits can be used to impeach a jury
verdict is that otherwise, litigants would obtain
juror affidavits on "all manner of things" and
the process would become interminable and
impracticable. Wheat v. Denver & R.C.W.R.
Co., 122 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932, 937 (1952).
Further, "[s]uch post mortems would be productive of no end of mischief and render
service as a juror unbearable." Id.
In State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81 (Utah
1988), the Utah Supreme Court considered
whether a juror's affidavit regarding a divine
revelation could be used to impeach the jury's
verdict under Utah R. Evid. 606(b). In DeMille,
a juror affidavit stated that £ne ~7ur5fr
allegedly told another juror during deliberations that she had prayed for a sign during
closing argument as to DeMille's guilt and
claimed to have received a revelation that if
defense counsel did not make eye contact,
DeMille was guilty. Defense counsel did not
make eye contact and DeMille was found
guilty.
In reviewing whether the juror affidavit
should have been admitted under Utah R.
Evid. 606(b), the court stated that construing
e"outside influence" to include responses to
J prayer could well infringe upon the juror's
{religious liberties, id. at 84. The court stated
that as long as the juror can fairly weigh the
evidence and apply the law to the facts, the
juror's decision cannot be challenged on the
jground that the juror reached the decision by
(jiid of prayer. Id. Accordingly, the court held
that under Rule 606(b), prayer and supposed
responses to prayer are not included within the
meaning of the words "outside influence." Id.
The court also noted, however, that a juror
might be disqualified from service if he or she
is unable to fairly consider the evidence and
properly apply the law due to oracular signs. Id.
The court then found that this fact did not
save DeMille's challenge to the verdict for two
reasons. Id. First, the affidavit did not aver
facts which would disqualify a juror. Second,
even if the affidavit averred such facts, the
court stated,
[a] claim that a juror is so affected
by religious conviction as to disqualify him or her from service does

not fall within these exceptions
[Rule 606(b)]; rather it goes to the
fitness of the person to serve on the
jury, a matter that could and
should have been raised at voir dire.
Id. at 85.
Applying the law to the facts in this case,
we need not reach whether the affidavit
alleged^Tact^ that would disqualify any juror
because, according to UeMille, juror affidavits
regarding divine revelations do not fall within
the exception set forth in Rule 606(b). Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in
excluding the juror affidavit.
We have examined the Qther issues raised in
this appeal and conclude that those issues are
without merit. Affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1 CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
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OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
This case involves real property occupied by
G.G.A., Inc., doing business as a Wendy's
Old Fashioned Hamburgers restaurant, located
at about 550 East 400 South in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Toula Leventis (Leventis), who leased
the property to G.G.A., appeals from the trial
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In 1985, Larsen disclosed the existence of the first
Tolman report during a deposition conducted pursuant to a civil suit over Salt Lake County's liability
for the fire. An inquiry by the grand jury and this
case followed.
On appeal, Harman questions the sufficiency of
the evidence, the admission of certain hearsay evidence, and the refusal of his request for a bill of
particulars. We find the first issue dispositive so we
do not reach the others.
We may review the verdict of a jury in a criminal
case and reverse as a matter of law if we find the
evidence is insufficient. See State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d
591, 593 (Utah 1988). However, the standard for
reversal is high. "We reverse ... only when the evidence ... is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime ...." State v. Pefree, 659 P.2d 443,
444 (Utah 1983). The weight and credibility to be
given a witness is an exclusive funaion of the jury. State
v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, all evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom must be reviewed in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict. Peiree, 659 P.2d at
444.
Although this is a high standard, it is not insurmountable. We will not make "speculative leap[s]
across ... remaining gap[s]" in the evidence. Id. at
445. Every element of the crime charged must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence
does not support those elements, the verdict must
fail.
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-510(1) (1978) defines
the crime of tampering with evidence. To be guilty,
an actor must have altered, destroyed, concealed, or
removed an item with the purpose to impair its verity
or availability to a pending, or potential, official
proceeding or investigation.1 A person must have the
same culpability to attempt to tamper with evidence.
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(1) (1978).
We now consider the evidence presented in this
case in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
Harman was chief of the investigations division of
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. Part of his
duties were to review and approve or disapprove
reports written by investigators. Reports could be
rejected for content as well as form. Harman testified he thought Tolman's first report "parroted"
Dean Larsen's opinion, contained unsupported
factual assertions, and was a "bad report." Furthermore, at approximately the same time as Harman
rejected the report, he told William Hyde and Lou
Midgley about Tolman's opinion and gave a copy of
the report to Hyde. Hyde, in turn, told the county
commissioners about Tolman's opinion. Hyde and
Midgley had requested the investigation in the first
place and, at that time, were in charge of the
county's defense of any liability claims arising from
the fire. Copies of the report were kept in several
files, including Hyde's case file and Tolman's investigative file. The documents in these files were available to the deputy county attorneys who responded
to discovery and Hyde produced his copy of the
Tolman report for the grand jury. There is no evidence that Harman made any attempt to alter, destroy
or remove the report from these files or to influence
others who knew of the report.

jury on numerous felony charges including conspiracy, tampering with a witness, and tampering with
evidence. After trial, the jury returned a verdict of
not guilty on the felony charges but guilty on the
lesser included offense of attempted tampering with
evidence, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8510 (1979), a class A misdemeanor. Harman seeks
reversal of that conviction claiming the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. We reverse.
In May 1983, a fire caused extensive damage to the
Fashion Place Plaza in Murray, Utah. At the time,
the Salt Lake County's mental health department
had its offices in the building. Dean Larsen, assistant
chief of the Murray City Fire Department, began an
immediate investigation into the cause and origin of
the fire. The next morning, Larsen met with Evan
Stephens, (Salt Lake County's risk manager) and
Lou Midgley, deputy county attorney. At the
meeting, Larsen stated that the fire had started in the
mental health offices. Stephens testified that he
thought such an opinion was premature especially
since substantial county liability was possible. Stephens requested assistance in his investigation of the
fire from the investigative division of the county
attorney's office. The request was sent to Harman,
who was then chief of the investigations division.
Harman assigned Ralph Tolman and Olin Yearby to
the case. Ralph Tolman and Dean Larsen were old
friends.
Upon arrival at the scene, Tolman and Yearby met
with Larsen, discussed Larsen's view of the origin of
the fire, and then began digging through the rubble
together. In spite of this joint activity, all three later
testified that they each conducted an independent
investigation. Larsen and Tolman became convinced
that a space heater and an electrical extension cord
found in the mental health offices had been the cause
of the fire.
Within a couple of days, Stephens and Midgeley
became concerned that a truly independent investigator was needed. The county contracted with Jim
Ashby of Global Investigations for that service.
Harman was told of the new investigator but the
evidence is conflicting whether Tolman and Yearby
were to continue. It is clear that they stopped
working on the case shortly thereafter.
Meanwhile, the space heater and the extension
cord were sent for analysis. The laboratory report
indicated that electrical current had not been present
in either the heater or the cord when those objects
burned. Ashby relied on this report in determining
that the heater and cord could not have started the
fire. He concluded the fire started in the roof above
the mental health offices. Larsen disregarded the
laboratory report and held firm in his earlier conclusion that the heater and cord had caused the fire.
Although both Larsen and Harman had been pressuring Tolman for his report, it was not written and
submitted for approval until August. Both the laboratory report and Ashby's full investigation report
preceeded Tolman's report. Tolman first submitted
the report to his immediate supervisor, Sam Dawson,
who rejected it. Tolman objected and demanded that
it be sent to Harman, who received the report and
also rejected it. In a heated discussion, Harman told
Tolman to write a new report. Tolman did so but
kept a copy of the first report in his investigation file
and also gave a copy to the Murray City Fire Chief,
Wendell Coombs. Also, Harman sent a copy of
Tolman's first report to William Hyde, supervisor of
the county attorney's civil division, and possibly
several others.

On the other hand, the prosecution introduced
evidence that Harman had said that the report would
make the county look bad, cost the county millions,
and make the county liable.
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In these circumstances, it became critical for the
state to show that Harman's rejection of Tolman's
report was improper. The state failed to do this.
Culpability can be implied from the actions and statements of the defendant, but the evidence must be
clear enough that the jury does not have to guess.
We believe that the evidence of guilt was so slight, so
conflicting, and so inherently improbable that reasonable minds could not have concluded that Harman
rejected the report in an attempt to alter, destroy,
conceal or remove it to impair its verity or availability, rather than rejecting it because it was a "bad
report."
We, therefore, hold that the evidence was insufficient to establish the required mental state. Since the
state failed to prove that critical element, Harman's
conviction is reversed.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W Garff, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. The full text of §76-8-510(1) reads:
A person commits a felony of the
second degree if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or
removes anything with a purpose to
impair its verity or availability in the
proceeding or investigation....
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ORDER
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Court of Appeals No. 870407-CA

Ralph Tolman and Claude Donald
Harman,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Orme, Davidson/ and Bench.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is
denied.

DATED th is

^Zfll

day of May, 1989.

FOR TfcE COURT:

'Mary y v Noonan
c / e r W o f t h e Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of May, 1989, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was mailed to each of the parties named below by
depositing the same in the United States mail.
Loni F. DeLand
Scott W, Reed
McRae & DeLand
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Dan R. Larsen
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
B U I L D I N G
MAIL
Rodney G. Snow
Attorney at Law
Clyde & Pratt
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Larry R. Keller
Attorney at Law
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Edward K. Brass
Attorney at Law
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102

DATED this 22nd day of May, 1989.

By "~~~"- <&A'S6t
/
Case Manager
+/
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LARRY R. KELLER #1785
No. 8 East Broadway
Judge Building, Suite 426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

RODNEY G. SNOW #3028
200 American Savings Plaza-'
77 West 200 South
\ "/;'
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410.1Telephone: (801) 322-2516
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore —
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

SUffLfintNTAL

UKUtK

Plaintiff,
v.
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, AND
RALPH TOLMAN,

Case No. CR-86-1522
(Judge Raymond Uno)

Defendants.
The matter of discovery came before the above-entitled Court
on January 30, 1987 with Larry R. Keller present and representing
Plaintiff, and Defendant Harman present and represented by Edward
K. Brass.
present.

Scott Reed, representing Defendant Tolman was also
After hearing arguments of counsel, the Court hereby

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES:
1.

Counsel for Plaintiff shall provide to Defendant Barman's

and Defendant Tolman's attorneys, at Defendants* expense, one
copy of all transcripts of the testimony of persons who appeared
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before the Salt Lake County Grand Jury on the matter which gave
rise to the Indictment in the above-entitled case.
2.

No person receiving a copy of the transcript of testi-

mony before the Grand Jury shall allow any person other than a
member of the staff of the attorney or the Defendant himself to
view or read said transcript.

Further, it is ordered that no

other copies of the transcript of Grand Jury testimony shall be
created without specific permission of the court.

It is further

ordered that any violation of the above orders shall subject the
violator to the full contempt powers of this Court.
DATED this

day of February, 1987.

RAYMOND S. TJNO
T
Tni/rd District Court'.(Judge
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LARRY R. KELLER (1785)
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South, Box 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

OCT 8 1987

RODNEY G. SNOW (3028)
200 American Savings Plaza
77 West 200 South
Salt- Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-2516

Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore —
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Term

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
RALPH TOLMAN'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. CR-86-1522

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond Uno
Defendants.

Came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of August, 1987,
Defendant's motion for a new trial and the Court having read the
memoranda filed by the parties and having considered the arguments of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now therefor
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That Defendant's motion for a new trial is denied; and
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2.

That the Affidavit of Karl E. Anderson be stricken from the

record.
DATED this 8th day of October, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Raymond Uno
District Judge

_

ATTEST
H DiXON KiNDLEY
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By ^ Atf klfci% J\jX** "^ '
I

\ ^ Deputy Clerk

I hereby certify that I served true and correct copies of the
foregoing, by placing said copies in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, this 8th day of October, 1987, to the following:
Edward K. Brass, Esq.
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Loni F. DeLand, Esq.
Scott W. Reed, Esq.
McRae & DeLand
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
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Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM

V.

Case No. CR 86-1522

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, and
RALPH TOLMAN,

Judge Raymond Uno

Defendant.
FACTS
On April 9, 1986, Ralph R. Tolman appeared before the
Salt Lake County Grand Jury pursuant to a subpoena issued by
authority of that body.

At no time prior to his appearance was

he informed that he was a subject or "target" of the Grand Jury
investigation.
As Tolman was being brought before the Grand Jury for
testimony, he was instructed orally by Special Prosecutor Larry
Keller that he was a "target".

When Tolman stated that he no

longer wished to remain to testify, Keller then stated that
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Tolman must stay pursuant to the subpoena, as well as the documents Tolman had brought.
On the record before the Grand Jury, it was "suggested"
that Tolman was a subject of the investigation and that he had a
right to have counsel "present" outside the Grand Jury room.
(Tolman testimony, April 9, 1986, p.2.)

At no point was Tolman

informed of the potential charges against him.
It should be noted that at least two other potential
subjects of the Grand Jury investigation received letters so
informing them in advance of their appearance before the Grand
Jury.

(Harman testimony, April 17, 1986, p.5; Dawson testimony,

April 15, 1986, p.2.)
ARGUMENT
With regard to the appearance and testimony before the
Grand Jury of an investigation subject or "target", the Utah
Supreme Court has ruled that such person is more than just a
witness, but an accused within the meaning of Article I, Section
Twelve of the Utah Constitution.
429 P.2d 969 (1967).

State v. Ruggeri, 19 U.2d 216,

In that case, a county commissioner named

Brady was subpoenaed before the Grand Jury but not informed that
he was a target of the investigation.

Based upon his testimony,

Brady was subsequently prosecuted for perjury.

Prior to trial,

the district court judge (Ruggeri) granted a motion to suppress
the use of said testimony as evidence.
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The plaintiff filed a proceeding before the Supreme
Court for a writ to compel Ruggeri to reverse his decision, which
the Supreme Court declined to do.

The court also ruled that:

". . . one being investigated for crime is
not just a witness and cannot be treated as
such. The target of an investigation is an
accused within the meaning of the Constitution, and when he is detained in any significant way, he may not be interrogated unless
he is advised of the charges against him then
under consideration. To fail to so warn one
so being investigated is to entrap him and to
violate his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination."
429 P.2d at 973. [Emphasis added.]
The court further observed that the violation occurs notwithstanding any assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege, and that the
immunity is complete.
The court concludes its observation as follows:
"It would seem that a witness who is unaware
that he is a target of a grand jury investigation could not intelligently determine
whether or not he needed counsel unless he
was fully advised of the charges being
considered against him; and until he has full
knowledge regarding this matter, he will not
know when to assert his constitutional claim
of privilege against self-incrimination. It
would also be difficult to believe that he
could intelligently waive the right to
counsel under such circumstances."
429 P.2d at 975.
It is clear that Tolman had no notice of his target
status prior to appearance at the Grand Jury.

Once at the Grand

>Jury, his appearance was "custodial" requiring complete Miranda
admonition.

As in Ruggeri, it is difficult to believe Tolman
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could be fully apprised of his rights unless he had known and had
the opportunity to share with counsel his status as a subject.
For that reason alone the indictment should be guashed
or the testimony suppressed as evidence against either Defendant,
DATED this

/ 3 day of February, 1987.

^TONI F. D e L A N D r
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

£j£t
SCOTT W. REED
^^"
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

j>3

day of February,

1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered
to Larry R. Keller, Judge Building, #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; Rodney G. Snow, 77 West 200 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.
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LONI F. DeLAND
SCOTT W. REED
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)

MOTION FOR A BILL OF
PARTICULARS

)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-86-1522
Judge Raymond Uno

Defendant, Ralph Tolman, by and through his attorneys,
Loni F. DeLand and Scott W. Reed, moves the court pursuant to
Rule 4(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 77-35-4 (amended
1D80) , to order the production of a statement of particular
factual information regarding the following:
1.

With regard to Count I and Count II:

a.

State the exact date, time, location and general

nature of the agreement constituting the conspiracy as charged in
Count I.
b.

State the intended conduct constituting a crime and

by whom the conduct was performed.
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c.

Describe the nature of the official proceeding or

investigation pending or about to be instigated.
d.

State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-

dant Tolman believed such proceeding or investigation as described above was pending or about to be instigated.
e.

State the specific manner in which Defendant Tolman

is alleged to have altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed the
investigative report.
f.

Specify what presentation or use of a false report

was made by Defendant Tolman for the purpose of deceiving a
public servant or servants, and specify which public servant(s).
2.

With regard to Count IV:

a.

State the specific acts alleged to have been

committed by Defendant Tolman to induce or cause C. Dean Larsen
to withhold testimony, information documents or things.
b.

Specify which element of testimony, information,

document or thing was alleged to have been the subject of such
inducement or cause, beside the seven page report.
c.

State whether said report was in fact withheld by

C. Dean Larsen.
d.

State the date# time, location and general nature

of acts alleged.
e.

Describe the nature of the official proceeding or

investigation which was pending or about to be instituted.
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f.

State the specific basis for alleging that Defen-

dant Tolman believed that such proceeding or investigation as
described above was pending or about to be instituted.
3,

With regard to Count V:

a*

State the specific nature of the benefit or harm

intended by Defendant Tolman.
b.

State the specific acts which Defendant Tolman

performed or failed to perform.
c.

State the specific basis upon which it is alleged

that the acts or omissions performed by Defendant Tolman were
knowingly performed.
DATED this

/

day of December, 1986.

LONI F.
D e L A N D '
Attorney for Defendant Tolman

SCOTT W. REED
Attorney for Defendant Tolman
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that'on the

/

day of December,

1986, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with
postage prepaid fully thereon, to Larry R. Keller, #8 East
Broadway, Judge Building, Suite 426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111;
Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101; and Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
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riLlfD IN CLEHK'S QF?IC~.
Salt Lake County, UtaL

AUG 19 198/

LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone:
(801) 364-1333
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Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF KARL
ANDERSON
Case No. CR86-1522
Judge Raymond S. Uno

)

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Karl Anderson, being first duly sworn upon my oath,
depose and state:
1.

Affiant, Karl Anderson, was a juror in the

above-captioned case.
2.

After the second day of jury deliberation in this

matter, the jury was in agreement that Defendant Tolman's guilt
had not been established on any charge and the jury was 6-2 in
favor of acquittal as to Defendant Harman.
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3.

Several jurors wished to break at or about 5:00

p.m. due mostly to church obligations (L.D.S.).

I expressed a

desire to remain since our verdict (of acquittal) seemed close at
hand.
4.

One juror, a professed L.D.S. seminary teacher, who

was the strong force for conviction, suggested we join in a group
prayer to obtain divine guidance in our deliberations.
5.

I was unhappy about the interjection of religion

but five other jurors seemed to follow the seminary teachers lead
on most matters and agreed to participate in the prayer.
6.

I essentially ignored the prayer but I did note

that immediately following the prayer the seminary teacher
expressed a certain knowledge gained from the exercise.
7.

I do not recall whether he claimed inspiration,

revelation or some other such guidance but he almost immediately
convinced the other five jurors of need to find the Defendants
guilty and from that point on, those six jurors became totally
immovable.
8.

It was obvious that from that moment on the jurors

who prayed would not be swayed in spite of their previous beliefs
that the evidence was insufficient.
9.

As stated in my prior affidavit, I eventually gave

in to convictions because the majority wouldn't consider changing
and I was not aware we could be a hung jury.

There is no ques-

tion that the seminary teacher's call for prayer and subsequent
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expressions of his knowledge of what was required of the jury was
the reason for guilty verdicts.
DATED this

/ ^ day of August, 1987.

*ARL ANDERSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/ ^/ day of

August, 1987.

-NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires: (#~ U —tfQ
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

MAY 4 1987

LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
SCOTT W. REED (4124)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
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Attorneys for Defendant Tolman
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

1

AFFIDAVIT OF KARL E.

\

ANDERSON

V.

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

i
]

Case No. CR-86-1522
Judge Raymond Uno

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, KARL E. ANDERSON, being first duly sworn upon my
oath, depose and state:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah,

residing at 3421 South 7860 West in Magna, Utah.
2.

Commencing on February 17, 1987 until March 6,

1987, I served as one of eight jurors in the case of State of
Utah v. Claude Donald Harman and Ralph Tolman.
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3.

At no time during the trial or jury deliberations

did I form any opinion or belief that Ralph Tolman was guilty of
any of the charges.
4.

At no time was I instructed or led to believe that

I need not return a verdict or could withhold my verdict resulting in no decision by the jury,
5.

Had I known or been instructed that withholding my

vote and maintaining a position of not guilty was allowable and
would not result in prolonged deliberation, I would not have cast
a vote of guilty in this case.
6.

Since the time of trial and deliberation, my belief

in this matter has not changed.
DATED this

*/

day of May, 1987.

/^r^

RARL E. ANDERSON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

JC^^
V

day of

May, 1987.

-NOTARY'PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
My Commission Expires: [0- fc -$n

0 oo
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

t
T

day of May, 1987, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to
Edward K. Brass, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102;
Larry R. Keller, Judge Building #426, 8 East 300 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111; and Rodney G. Snow, American Plaza, 77 West 200
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. *t- C&tk.*.
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ADDENDUM

£

PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL
PROCEEDINGS, FEBRUARY 25, 1987;
STATE V. TOLMAN AND HARMAN,
CR-86-1522; R. 945 ET SEQ.

TESTIMONY OF C. DEAN LARSEN
SELECTED PAGES
RE: TOLMAN TAMPERING ALLEGATIONS

Mr. Snow's Direct: 951-954
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K

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
1

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
-ooOoo3
4

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

5
6
7

vs.

Criminal No. CR-86-1522

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN and
RALPH TOLMAN,

©FY

8
Defendants.
9
10

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

11
12

February 25, 1987

13
14
15

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO
District Court Judge

16
17
A P P E A R A N C E S ;

18
For t h e S t a t e o f U t a h :

19
20
21
22
23

RODNEY G. SNOW
Attorney at Law
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
-andLARRY R. KELLER
Attorney at Law
8 East Broadway #426
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

24
25
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1

tell defendant Tolman you had not destroyed the report?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

After your second deposition, did you have

4

a telephone call with defendant Tolman, a telephone

5

conversation?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And were you in your office?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Did you call Mr. Tolman?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

This would be sometime in November of 1984, SIC

12

I take it?

13

A.

That's correct.

14

Q.

Was there anyone present in your office when

15

you made the telephone call, sir?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Do you know whether anyone else was on the

18

line when you talked to Mr. Tolman?

19

A.

I don't know.

20

Q.

Can you tell us what you said to him and what

21 1 he said to ;you on this occasion?
22
23

A.

j

I told Ralph ^that his report was coming out

in_ the depo sition and his response was, "Dean, do what

24 1 you have to do, tell the truth, Ralph will take care of

|
|

25 J himself and he will tell the truth."
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Q.

Okay.

Did you tell him anything else about

how you handled the report in the first deposition?
v
»
< '
A.
No.
Qo

Do you recall whether you told him you had

skated around the issue?
Yes,
Q.

The report issue?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You didn't tell him the report had actually

10 I come out?
11

A.

I believe I told him that

12

Q.

I mean that

13

A.

They talked about the report in the deposition.

14

Q.

All right.

15

else?

16

—

—

Did defendant Tolman say anything

Did he express any concern at that point?
A.

Just "Here, Dean," that for me to tell the

17

truth and that Ralph ^would take care of himself and he

18

would tell the truth.

19

Q.

Did he express that he wished it hadn't come

21

A.

Yes, he did.

22

Q.

What do you recall him saying in that regard?

23

A.

20 .up?

24
25

"I wished it wouldn't have to come out, but

if it does, here, Dean, tell the truth."
Q.

Okay.

You understood him to be telling you
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1

to tell the truth about what Ralph's opinion and conclusions

2

might have been about the cause and origin of the fire?

3

A.

That's correct.

4

Q.

After the second deposition in December of 1985/

5

did you again —

6

the deposition, did you again telephone Mr. Tolman?

and after you had released the report at

7

A.

Yes.

8 1

Q.

Do you recall whether you telephoned him before

9

this deposition or was it after?
..

.I

i

I , .

i n

i

,

i

^

10

A.

As far as I can recall, after the deposition.

11

Q.

Do you recall when you first made the telephone

12

call to the office, the County Attorney's Office, whether

13

you spoke to Ralph?

14

A.

15

not in.

I talked to —

I asked for Ralph.

Ralph was

I talked to Olin Yearby.

16 I

Q.

What did you tell Olin Yearby?

17

A.

That the»report had come out and they had copies

18

of it.

19

Q.

What did Olin Yearby say?

20

A.

"Oh, shit, Larsen.

21
22
23

I wish it wouldn't have.

Ralph is probably in deep trouble."
Q.

Did you thereafter receive a telephone call

from Tolman?

24

A.

I don't recall if Ralph called me back or if

25

I called him.
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1
2

Q.

But subsequent to the Yearby conversation, you

had another conversation about the deposition with Mr. Tolma4

3

A.

Thatsf correct.

4

Q.

Where were you when that conversation occurred?

5

A.

In my office.

6

Q.

As far as you know, Mr. Tolman was at work?

7

A.

As far as I know.

8 1

Q.

What was said in that conversation?

9

A.

I wished it wouldn't have come out, but ithas,

10

you was under oath.

U

the truth.

12
13
14
15
16 I

Q.

%

You told the truth.

Ralph will tell

Ralph can take care of himself.
Did defendant Tolman express any concern tp

y<?u about what was going to happen next?
A.

He was worried.

He knew there was problems

with his job and he was very concerned about that.
Q.

Okay.

Sir, I am going to hand you your grand

17

jury testimony of April 9th.

If you could turn to page

18

17, please.

19

telephone conversation, you had with defendant Tolman in

Now, Mr. Larsen, turning to the conversation,

20 - August of 1983 after you had received the report in which
21

he suggested to you you get rid of the report or burn it

22

or destroy it, I would like you to read, if you would, please,

23

lines 13 through 19.

24
25

A.

"He thinks we're friends and I am helping you

on the investigation of the fire," something to that effect.
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\

A.

Yes,

2

Q.

And was that testimony accurate when you gave

3
4

it before the grand jury?
A.

5 J

Yes.
MR. SNOW:

Thank you.

6
7 I
S
9 I

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. DeLAND:
Q.

Morning, Chief.

You told us yesterday that

JO

this report, this report of Ralph Tolman's came to your

jj

attention fry way of Chief Coombs; is that correct?

12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

Who was your boss?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And so your understanding is that the report

16

went from Mr. Tolman to Chief Coombs to yourself?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

Q.

You don't recall receiving any report directly

19

from Mr. Tolman to you?

20 r

A.

I don't recall.

21

Q.

Do you recall picking up any reports at

22

Mr. Tolman's office from Joan Binkerd or from any other

23

source?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Do you recall being over there during that period
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1
2
3

THE COURT:
Q.

He may answer.

(By Mr. DeLand) • Did he ever make such a

statement to you?

^

4

A.

Could you reask the question again, please?

5

Q.

Yes.

Did Chief Coombs, at or about the time

6

he gave you the Tolman report, say anything such as "Ralph

7

gave me this report and told me not to use it unless we

8

had to, not to disclose it to Don Harman," that we had it

9

but that he would tell the truth and we should?

10

A.

I recall some sort of a conversation like that
,

11

Q«

,

All right.

^

And in fact a conversation you have

12

not told us about yet today occurred at the very time Ralph

13

talked to you about concealing this report or destroying

14

this report or getting rid of it; isn't that true?

15

was a conversation you had with Ralph at that time that

16

you haven't reported.

17

been asked about it?

18
19

MR. SNOW:
is clear.

20
21
22

Isn't that correct?

There

You haven't

Your Honor, I don't think the question

I would object
MR. DeLAND:

—

Maybe it's not.

It wouldn't be

the first time I asked an unclear question.
Q.

Let me ask you this:

You had a conversation

23

with Ralph Tolman at the

time you already told us about

24

concerning his request that you conceal this report, for

25

lack of a better word; is that right?
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1

A.

That's correct.

2

Q.

All right.

And at that time you have testified

3

that he said "Destroy the report.

4

words to that effect?

5

A.

That's correct.

6

Q.

All right.

7

Get rid of the report,"

He also told you not to physically

destroy the report, didn't he?

8

A.

I don't recall the exact verbiage.

9

Q.

All right.

10

In fact, you do recall vividly that

he said "Harman is hot"?

11

A.

I do recall that.

12

Q.

All right.

13

You don't remember the exact verbiage

of anything else, what was said at that time, do you?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

But you have repeated certain understandings

16

that you had about the conversation?

17

A.

That's correct.

18

Q.

And isn't it? true that you understood that he

19

merely wanted the fact that you had the report concealed

20 • from Mr. Harman?
21

A.

That's my opinion.

22

Q.

He told you in fact at that time, "If you have

23

j

to use it, use it, tell the truth about this report"?

24

A.

That's correct.

25

Q.

He never asked you to lie at any time?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

In any proceeding?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

And in fact the term "destroy," that's your

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

characterization of what was said, isn't it?
A.

I don't recall if that was correct verbiage

of my interpretation.
Q.

All right.

And in fact in your grand jury

K

testimony you used the word "not disclose"; isn't that right^
A.

I believe I used both words destroy and not

disclose.
Q.

All right.

Wasn't it the prosecutor that suggested

the word destroy?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Would you turn to page 21 of your grand jury

16

testimony of April 9th of 1986?

17

A.

Which page?

18

Q.

Page 21.

19

I will read the question of Mr. Keller1!

at line 11 and will you read your response?

20*

"Question:

21

Tolman, "did you suggest to him that you would

22

destroy the report or —

23

A.

"Yes.

24

Q.

"Question:

25

Did you suggest to him/'meaning

"

I told him I would not disclose it."
Were those your words that you

wouldn't disclose it?"
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1

Answer?

2

A.

"I can't remember the exact verbiage."

3

Q.

You did use the word "destroy" in the prior

*

deposition, the second deposition; isn't that correct?

5

A.

That's correct.

*

Q.

And the prosecutor recalled to you you did use

'

that word then?

8

A.

That's correct.

'

Q.

But you didn't know what the verbiage was?

10

A.

I don't recall the exact verbiage.

11

Q.

You know it's your testimony today your

12

understanding was physically retain the report, just do^i't

13

J,et Mr. Harman see it?

14

A.

15

Q.

That was my interpretation.
All right.

And so at the time the report is

*

»

^

16

received, your information is "Don't tell any lies about

17

my opinions about this report," correct?

18

A.

That's correct.

19

Q.

And, again, after the first deposition when

20

you notify Mr. Tolman that you have skated around the truth,_J|

21

shall we say, he again told you, "Tell the truth.

22

can take care of himself"?

Ralphy

23

A.

That's correct.

24

Q^

And then the second^deposition, "Don't worry

25 I about it.

You tell the truth.

I am going to tell the trut^h.
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1
2

Ralph can take care of himself"?
A.
«*—

3

Q.

That's correct.
...,

And so the concealment, if any, was your loyalty

4

to a friend, thinking you were doing what was best for him

5

in front of that group of attorneys.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Protecting his job from Mr. Harman.

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q*.

Who you knew he was having very bad relations

10

|

|

with at that^time^.

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And so when he said, "I wished it hadn't come

13

out," he wished it hadn't come out so Mr. Harman woulc^ know |

14

about it; isn't that your understanding?

15

A.

That's my impression.

16

Q.

At the time you spoke with —

during the first

17

deposition, Mr. Snow pointed out that the business about

18

the report coming up —

19

apparently

20

reflected in the transcript of the deposition; is that right?

came up and there was some concern,

on your part, and there was a break.

It's not

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

You went out in the hall with Mr. Craig Hall.

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Craig Hall is the Murray City attorney.

25

A.

Yes.

|
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1

Q.

Who was representing you.

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And in that break you disclosed to Mr. Hall

4

that there physically was a report over in your office,,

5

didn't you?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And I take it that Mr. Hall then advised you

8

to do what you did thereafter, to skate around the report?

9

A.

That's correct.

10

Q.

So other than what you were requested by

i

11

Mr. Tolman to prevent his boss from finding out about this,

12

he had at all times encouraged you to tell the truth.

13

A.

That's correct.

1

14

Q.

That's all.

|

15
CROSS-EXAMINATION

16
17
18
19

BY MR. BRASS:
Q.

Let's talk about your investigations,since

that was one of the things that Mr. Snow talked to you about.!
You think that Jim Ashby is an expert in this

20
21

area, don't you?

22

A.

He's good.

23

Q.

Okay.

24

25

j

And you think that you're every bit as

good as he is; is that right?
A.

That's correct.
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1

ft

So there wasn't any question in your mind that

2

at least some people in the Salt Lake County Attorney's

3

Office knew what
k

4
5
6

ft

9

12

ft

Because you assumed they already knew, based

k

A.
ft

k
ft

18
ft

23

ft

Yes.
From t h e d e f e n d a n t Tolman?

k
ft

I had heard comments.
Comments about his boss?

k

22

I had heard those rumors.
Did defendant Tolman ever tell you that?

A.

20

That's correct.
You understood he wasn't in love with defendant

16

21

> you have been good friends with defendant

Tolman as of May of 1983 for quite some time.

Harman?

19

That's correct.
Now

ft

15

17

No.

on what you had heard in conversation?

13
14

You didn't feel a need to tell them at that

k

10
11

That's correct.

point in time, did you?

7
8

defendant Tolman's conclusions were?

Yes.
In that conversation in May of 1983, I am sorry,

24

in August of 1983, the telephone conversation you got, is

25

there any question in your mind defendant Tolman suggested
L

N

to you that you destroy or get rid of the report?
999 I
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1

ft

Didn't disclose it until Tom Green came out,

2

and in that conversation you thought you better tell themx

3

about it3

4

A.

That's correct.

5

ft

And you understood that if you disclosed the

6

report to anyone that had anything to do with the fire,

7

defendant Harman would find out about it?

8

A.

That's correct.

9

ft

So we weren't just playing, if I may, sir, keep-

10

away, from defendant Harman here, were we?

11

A.

No.

12

ft

Now, the first time you recall a telephone

13

conversation with defendant Tolman where he tells you you

14

h_ave to do what you have to do, Ralph will take care of ^

15

himself, just tell the truth, is after your deposition in

16

1984.

17

A.

That's correct.

18

ft

And defendant Tolman knew at that point you

19

hadn't physically produced a report?

20

A.

Yes.

21

ft

But he understood you made some reference to

22

it in your deposition.

23

A.

Yes.

24

ft

You said you wished you hadn't done that, but

25

you had to do what you had to do?
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1

A.

That's correct.

2

a

And as you testified previously on direct

3

yesterday and again on cross today, when you came back from

4

your corLversation with Craig Hall, it wasn't quite accurate

5

to say irou hadn't seen a copy of the report.

6

A.

That's correct.

7

a

And that you did that to protect defendant Tolmarj

8

because you had that conversation with defendant Tolman

9

in August of 1983.
'

i

1

10

k

Yes.

11

ft

Then another 13 months goes by and the report

12

remains wherever it was for that —

13

for the next succeeding 13 months.

before the deposition

14

A.

That's correct.

15

ft

You don't look for it?

16

A.

No.

17

ft

You don't dig it out or produce it?

18 i

&

No.

19
20

1

^

|

It's only when your deposition is noticed up

again and it becomes an issue that you dig it out and you

21 1 finally produce it.
22

k

That's correct.

23

ft

Now, with respect to your deposition in December

24

of 1985, where you testified that, I believe under oath

25

for the first time, about this conversation with defendant
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|

|
|

1
2

ft

to keep from being

3
4
5

A.
ft

Yes.
Anxious to please these gentlemen who were the

A.

No,
You d i d n f t care if you pleased them or not?

ft

8 I
9

indicted?

prosecutors there, perhaps?

6
7

Would it be fair to say you were very anxious

A.
ft

No.
And so any changes in your testimony really

10

didn't have anything to do with any conversations you had

It

with M r . Keller and Mr. Snow, did it?

12
13

A.
ft

No.
You were aware that the significance of the

14

Tolman report was that it merely corroborated the report

15

that you prepared

16

A.

yourself?

That's correct.

17

ft

And it was a second opinion, if you will?

18

A.
*
ft

Yes.

19

^.
And you also knew that whenever that was litigate

20

with or without the report, Mr. Tolman was going to come

21

in and tell the truth, give his opinions?

22 I

A.

That's correct.

23

ft

And so not 1bo beat a dead horse, 1but .It's also
"get rid of <and

24

true, then, that at the time the se words

25

destroy" are being used , it was not to physically get rid/
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of that report but to conceal the fact it went to you from
this man?
k

In my opinion.

ft

And any concealment that you may have engaged

in, any lies you may have told in depositions thereafter
were not suggested by Mr. Tolman but were the product of
your own decision,thinking you were going to protect him.
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You didn't know for a fact that if you told

10 I someone else it would get to Harman necessarily, did you?

11 I

A.

12 I

No.
MR. DeLAND:

That's

all.

13

14

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

15

BY MR. BRASS:

16

Q.

Let's start with the $2 million.

You were

17

telling Mr. Snow and the jury that your recall actually

18

has improved since your deposition was taken; is that right?

19

A.

That's correct.

20

Q.

So as more time goes by, you're recalling more

2i

details?

22

A.

A few.

23

Q.

Okay.

24
25

And maybe if we came back in another

year you might recall some^more?
k

Possible.
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

v.

EX PARTE MOTION FOR
EXTENSION OF TIME TO
FILE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

RALPH TOLMAN,

Supreme Ct. Case No.

Plaintiff/Respondent,

Defendant/Appellant.

Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA

Defendant, Ralph Tolman, through his counsel, Loni F.
DeLand, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, requests that this Court grant a 30 day extension of time
within which to file his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the
above-entitled matter, for the reason that counsel for Defendant
needs additional time to prepare said Petition due to the extensive record and complex issues.
The Petition is presently due on June 21, 1989.
DATED this

day of June, 1989. /

LONI F. DeLAND
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

L-l
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LONI P. DeLAND (0862)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
ORDER
v.
RALPH TOLMAN,

Supreme Ct. Case No.

Defendant/Appellant.

Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA

Based upon the foregoing motion, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant/Appellant is
granted a 30 day extension of time within which to file his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above-entitled matter.
Said Petition shall be filed on or before July 21, 1989.
DATED

UTAH SUPREME COURT

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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LONI P. DeLAND (0862)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

v.

MOTION AND STIPULATION
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
FILE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

RALPH TOLMAN,

Supreme Ct. Case No.

Plaint iff/Respondent,

Defendant/Appellant.

Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA

Defendant/Appellant, Ralph Tolman, through his counsel,
Loni F. DeLand, requests that this Court grant a seven (7) day
extension of time within which to file his Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, which is presently due on July 21, 1989, for the
reason that counsel for Defendant has a family emergency and is
unable to complete said Petition by July 21, 1989.
DATED this

VQ

day of July, 1989.

)NT FNJDeLAND
Attorney for Defendant7Appellant
STIPULATION
I, Dan R. Larsen, attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent,
hereby agree and stipulate to a seven (7) day extension of time
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within which Defendant/Appellant may file his Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.
DATED this

day of July, 1989.

DAN R. LARSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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LONI F. DeLAND (0862)
McRAE & DeLAND
132 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 364-1333
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Tolman
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent, !
ORDER
v.
]1

RALPH TOLMAN,

Supreme Ct. Case No.
Ct. of Appeals No. 870407-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Based upon the foregoing Motion and Stipulation, and
good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant/Appellant is
granted a seven (7) day extension of time within which to file
his Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the above-entitled matter.
Said Petition shall be filed on or before July 28, 1989.
DATED this <r '

day of July, 1989.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ^/)

day of July, 1989, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to Dan

L-4
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R. Larsen, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent,

236 State Capitol,

Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 84114.
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